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11 Introduction
Since Obstfeld and Rogo⁄(2000) established their claim that trade costs contribute to explaining
the "six major puzzles in open economy macroeconomics", a growing literature has scrutinized
the relationship between frictions in goods trade and the observed home bias in equity holdings.1
In the presence of such frictions, technology shocks lead to stronger ￿ uctuations in the national
price level, and the home bias may re￿ ect agents￿desire to insure against ￿real exchange rate
risk￿ : if domestic ￿rms￿pro￿ts are high whenever the domestic price level is high, i.e. the real
exchange rate appreciates, this is a compelling reason to increase the share of domestic equities
relative to the frictionless benchmark. Variations in the real exchange rate may be due to a
relatively large weight of domestic goods in agents￿consumption baskets ￿i.e. a home bias in
consumption (Kollmann 2006) ￿ , the presence of goods that are non-tradable (Stockman and
Dellas 1989, Collard et al. 2007), or the existence of trading costs which drive a wedge between
the domestic and the foreign price of a good. In Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000), Obstfeld (2007)
and Coeurdacier (2009), these costs take the form of ￿iceberg costs￿ , i.e. a leak in the bucket
which transports goods from one country to another.
Both Coeurdacier and Obstfeld point towards two important challenges which this literature
faces: Firstly, they illustrate that trade costs in goods markets cannot generate a home bias
in equities under standard preference assumptions. Secondly, the equilibrium equity portfolios
they derive are extremely sensitive to variations in the model parameters. In this paper we
propose ￿distribution costs￿as an alternative source of international price di⁄erences and real
exchange rate ￿ uctuations. We argue that including these costs into an otherwise standard
model of international portfolio choice goes a long way in explaining observed equity investment
patterns ￿even if consumers have no particular preference for domestic traded goods, and even
if there is an incentive to hedge labor-income risk by purchasing foreign equities (Baxter and
Jermann 1997, Baxter and King 1998). Hence, although we put ourselves into an unfavorable
starting position relative to endowment-economy models, our framework is able to generate a
diversi￿cation pattern that is close to real-world portfolio shares. Moreover, we demonstrate
that, in such a setup, agents￿portfolio choices do not exhibit the dramatic sensitivity to small
parameter variations that characterizes many other models of international risk sharing.
Our results are derived within a stochastic two-country general equilibrium model in which
agents purchase shares of domestic and foreign ￿rms in order to maximize their expected util-
1Surveys of both the empirical and theoretical literature on the ￿home bias puzzle￿ are provided by Lewis
(1997) and Obstfeld (2007). Sercu and Vanpee (2007) show that the portfolio share of domestic equities is on
average 70% in 20 industrialised countries, ranging from 49% in Belgium to around 90% in Greece and Japan.
1ity. Agents consume domestic and foreign traded goods as well as nontraded goods. We follow
Burstein et al. (2003) in assuming that every traded good has to be augmented by a certain
amount of (nontraded) retail services. While it has long been recognized that such a constellation
results in international price di⁄erences at the retail and wholesale levels (Corsetti et al. 2008a)
and that the existence of distribution services raises the e⁄ective share of nontraded goods in
GDP (Collard et al. 2007), we argue that accounting for distribution costs adds several features
that are important for agents￿portfolio choice: ￿rst, the existence of retail services increases the
demand for nontraded goods at given prices and reduces the e⁄ective elasticity of the demand for
traded goods. Both aspects enhance the importance of pro￿ts in ￿nancing agents￿consumption
and thus magnify any shock that causes a variation in pro￿ts. Moreover, the existence of distri-
bution costs limits consumers￿scope for expenditure switching and thus reinforces the positive
relationship between nontraded goods ￿rms￿prices and their pro￿ts. Conversely, it cushions the
impact of terms of trade ￿ uctuations on traded goods ￿rms￿pro￿ts. Finally, distribution costs
reinforce the in￿ uence of nontraded goods prices on the real exchange rate.
These features a⁄ect agents￿demand for domestic and foreign assets by in￿ uencing the second
moments that are crucial for agents￿portfolio choices: domestic equities are a good hedge against
￿real exchange rate risk￿if the covariance between domestic pro￿ts and the real exchange rate
is negative.2 If domestic ￿rms￿pro￿ts are high whenever the domestic price level is high, agents
￿nd it advantageous to invest a large share of their wealth in domestic equity, since the loss in
purchasing power is compensated by an increase in income. Conversely, agents have an incentive
to hedge their non-diversi￿able labor income by purchasing foreign equities if domestic pro￿ts
are positively correlated with labor income. The existence of distribution costs in￿ uences these
covariances: higher distribution costs raise the (negative) covariance between domestic pro￿ts
and the real exchange rate and reduce the (positive) covariance between pro￿t and labor income.
Thus, distribution costs a⁄ect agents￿portfolio choice by reducing the incentive to hedge labor
income risk and by enhancing the incentive to hedge real exchange rate risk ￿with the latter
motive becoming less important as distribution costs grow large.
As we will show, our model generates realistic portfolio choices for a wide range of parameter
values. Hence, even if we depart from our benchmark parameterization, the resulting portfolio
shares do not assume implausibly high or low values. This surprising stability ￿which is in
contrast to the ￿ndings of Obstfeld (2007) and Coeurdacier (2009) ￿is due to the fact that
distribution costs cushion the in￿ uence of parameter variations on prices and incomes. Thus,
in contrast to Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2009), who demonstrate that an asset structure
consisting not only of equities but also of internationally traded bonds can help to overcome
2We are using the price notation. An increasing real exchange rate thus corresponds to a real depreciation.
2the problems raised above, we show that even if we stick to the traditional assumption that
agents only trade equity, distribution costs go a long way in explaining the ￿home bias￿ in
international equity investment and help to resolve the high sensibility of equity portfolios to
preference parameters.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents and motivates the building
blocks of our model. In section 3, we explain how to extract optimal portfolio shares from the
log-linearized version of the model and how they are a⁄ected by the presence of distribution
services. Here we also o⁄er numerical results, focusing, in particular, on the parameter that
represents the size of distribution costs. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic structure
We use a stochastic two-economy general equilibrium model whose structure is based on Obst-
feld and Rogo⁄ (2000). Yet it di⁄ers crucially on two points. First, output is determined by
(endogenous) employment. Second, and more importantly, we choose a di⁄erent source of price
segmentation: while Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (2000) analyse the impact of iceberg-type trade costs
on the covariance between ￿ uctuations in the real exchange rate and ￿nancial income, we focus
on the consequences of service costs arising from distributing tradable goods to consumers.
The two economies are identical in terms of preferences, technologies, market structure as
well as size. We will use an asterisk (￿) to denote foreign magnitudes. Home and foreign agents
are indexed over the interval [0;1]. In both countries, varieties of a tradable and a non-tradable
good are produced. The number of di⁄erentiated goods in each of the four sectors is de￿ned
by a continuum of unit mass. Varieties of the domestic (foreign) tradable goods are indexed by
h 2 [0;1] (f 2 [0;1]), while varieties of the nontraded goods in home and foreign are indexed
by n 2 [0;1] and n￿ 2 [0;1]. Sectoral aggregates such as total pro￿ts or overall demand for a
good are denoted by H, F, N, and N￿, respectively. Each of the ￿rms is a monopolistic supplier
of a single variety and sets prices ￿ exibly. The productivity of ￿rms in the four industries
may each be hit by a technology shock, the realization of which is uncertain ex ante. Apart
from directly serving consumers, nontraded goods ￿rms also o⁄er their output to a perfectly
competitive retail sector. This sector combines traded goods (purchased at the wholesale level)
and nontraded goods when meeting ￿nal consumers￿demand for tradables.3
3Goldberg and Campa (2010) provide empirical evidence. By contrast, typical nontraded goods like housing,
health and education do not require wholesaling and retailing. They are delivered directly to ￿nal consumers.
32.2 Timing and preferences
The economy we consider lasts for two periods: in period 0, agents choose the share of their wealth
that they invest in domestic and foreign equities. In period 1, they decide on their labor supply,
collect wage incomes as well as the returns on their investments, and consume. Expected utility
of a representative domestic household as of period 0 is increasing in the aggregate consumption








In equation (1), E0 is the expectation operator across states of natures, ￿ is the degree of
relative risk aversion, and ￿ is a strictly positive parameter. The assumption of a constant
marginal disutility of labor implies an in￿nite wage elasticity of labor supply, which simpli￿es
the analysis. The household supplies labor to all ￿rms in the nontraded and traded goods sectors,
































CT is a bundle of tradables, CN is (￿nal) consumption of non-tradables and 0 < ￿ ￿ 1 is
the share of traded goods in the overall consumption basket. The consumer price index is P.
The elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods is ￿ > 0. The traded goods
aggregate depends on the consumption of domestic tradables (CH) and foreign tradables (CF),


























The parameter a measures the overall share of home goods in domestic traded goods consump-
tion. If a = 1
2, there is no home bias in traded goods consumption. Conversely, if 1
2 < a ￿ 1,
agents allocate a larger share of their tradables consumption to domestic goods. Note that the
aggregate traded goods price index PT consists of retail prices for home and foreign tradables.


























with ￿ denoting the elasticity of substitution, which we assume to be the same for traded and





















Agents in the foreign country have identical preferences.
42.3 International ￿nancial markets and budget constraints
In period 0, international trade in equity shares takes place. We follow Coeurdacier (2009) in
assuming that households in both countries can choose to hold positions in two equity assets:
claims on a share of the sum of future pro￿ts generated by domestic (tradables and non-tradables)
￿rms and claims on a share of the sum of future pro￿ts generated by foreign (tradables and non-
tradables) ￿rms. Hence, it is not possible to invest in the traded and nontraded goods industries
separately. At the beginning of the ￿rst period, households fully own their local ￿rms. The
supplies of domestic and foreign shares are normalized to one, respectively, and the representative
domestic and foreign consumers face the following budget constraints:
￿p + ’Sp￿ = p and ￿
￿p + ’￿Sp￿ = Sp￿; (5)
where ￿ (’) is the amount of domestic (foreign) shares purchased by domestic consumers and
p (p￿) is the price for an equity share denoted in the domestic (foreign) currency. The nominal
exchange rate S (in price notation) transforms foreign prices into domestic-currency units. Note
that ￿ also represents the share of an agent￿ s wealth allocated to domestic equities. Since we
normalize the total stock of domestic and foreign shares to one, the equilibrium is characterized
by ￿ + ￿
￿ = 1 and ’ + ’￿ = 1. Moreover, it follows from our symmetry assumptions that
￿ = ’￿ and ’ = ￿
￿, which implies ’ = ￿
￿ = 1￿￿. The domestic and foreign ￿rst-period budget
constraints can thus be rewritten as ￿p +(1 ￿ ￿)Sp
￿ = p and (1 ￿ ￿)p+ ￿Sp￿ = Sp￿. Domestic
agents thus purchase claims on ￿ ￿ 100 percent of domestic ￿rms￿future pro￿ts, and a claim on
(1￿￿)￿100 percent of foreign ￿rms￿future pro￿ts. Our goal is to derive the optimal value of ￿.
After the realization of shocks in period 1, households at home and abroad decide about
optimal consumption and labor supply subject to their respective budget constraint
PC = ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(S￿￿) + WL and SP￿C￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿S￿￿ + SW￿L￿; (6)
where W (W￿) is the nominal wage, while ￿ = ￿H+￿N and ￿￿ = ￿￿
F +￿￿
N are the sum of nom-
inal pro￿ts in the traded and nontraded goods industries at home and abroad, respectively. The
optimality conditions for consumption and labor supply for a representative domestic household













where the Lagrange multiplier for the second-period budget constraint is denoted by ￿. The
optimality conditions yield the relationship between the real wage and the marginal utility of
consumption. The foreign agent￿ s choices are described by identical ￿rst order conditions.
5The Euler equation that characterizes domestic agents￿optimal portfolio choice equalizes the
relative price of domestic equity to the relative gains in terms of expected marginal utility:
￿0 (p ￿ Sp￿) = E0[￿(￿ ￿ S￿￿)]; (8)
where ￿0 is the Lagrange multiplier referring to the budget constraint in period 0. Due to our
symmetry assumption, equity prices do not di⁄er across countries, i.e. p = Sp￿. Using this result









SP￿ ￿] = E0[
C￿￿￿
SP￿ S￿￿]: (9)
The portfolios at home and abroad are chosen optimally if the covariances between equity payo⁄s
(future pro￿ts) and marginal utility from consumption are the same for both assets. Thus, in
equilibrium households trade equity shares across borders until none of the two assets provides






SP￿ )] = 0: (10)
2.4 Goods markets and distribution costs
2.4.1 Demand for goods
Domestic consumption demand for variety h of the home traded good depends on the retail
price for this variety relative to the aggregate retail price index in this sector. It also depends on
the aggregate demand for domestic tradables. The demand of consumers for a nontraded good











































In modelling distribution costs, we follow the approach of Burstein et al. (2003) as well as
Corsetti and Dedola (2005): a perfectly competitive retail sector combines any unit of traded
goods (home or foreign) that it sells to domestic consumers with ￿ units of a composite nontraded










where ￿ (n) is the amount of nontraded variety n used by retailers. Due to perfect competition,
the domestic retail prices of domestic and foreign traded varieties ￿PH(h) and PF(f) ￿equal
6retail ￿rms￿marginal costs. These, in turn, are the sum of wholesale prices ￿ ~ PH(h) and ~ PF(f)
￿and the costs of nontraded services:
PH(h) = ~ PH(h) +
Z 1
0




Domestic retail ￿rms minimize their costs, given (13) subject to (12). Their demand for non-







Combining this with the demand by ￿nal consumers (11) yields





(CN + ￿CT); (15)
which is total demand for the non-tradable variety n. In the foreign country, analogous functions
apply, with retail prices depending on wholesale prices and the price of foreign retail services.
2.4.2 Price setting and pro￿ts









H(h)dh] ￿ WLH: (16)
where CH(h) (C￿
H(h)) is domestic (foreign) demand for the domestic traded variety h. ~ PH(h)
is the domestic wholesale price for a di⁄erentiated domestic traded good h, while ~ P￿
H(h) is the
respective price charged to the foreign retail sector and denoted in the foreign currency. The
output of ￿rm h is given by labor employed in its production and the productivity level in this




PN(n)(CN(n) + ￿(n))dn ￿ WLN: (17)
Similarly to the traded sector production technology, the output of ￿rm n in the nontraded
sector is given by labor employed in its production and the productivity level in this sector AN:
YN (n) = ANLN (n). The productivity parameters AH and AN can be seen as random shifts













and the covariance ￿ANAH = E0 (lnAH lnAN).
The overall resource constraints equal YH = CH + C￿
H and YN = CN + ￿CT, where YH and
YN re￿ ect total production in the two sectors. Similar conditions hold for the foreign country.
Firms in the domestic nontraded sector are monopolistic suppliers and maximize pro￿ts given





7with the marginal costs given by MCN = W=AN. Similar conditions hold for the foreign country.
Due to symmetry, all ￿rms in the nontraded sector at home and abroad set the same price in
equilibrium, i.e. PN(n) = PN and P￿
N(n￿) = P￿
N. Combined with (13) this implies that domestic
retail prices of domestic and foreign tradables are given by
PH(h) = ~ PH(h) + ￿PN and PF(f) = ~ PF(f) + ￿PN: (19)
Producers of traded goods varieties maximize (16), taking into account their marginal costs
MCH(h), the domestic demand function (11) as well as its foreign counterpart. Note that, while
￿rms set their prices at the wholesale level ￿ ~ PH(h) and ~ P￿
H(h) ￿consumers￿demand depends
on retail prices PH(h) and P￿
H(h). Substituting (19) into (11) yields
CH(h) =
 
~ PH(h) + ￿PN
















Taking these demand functions into account, ￿rms in the domestic traded goods industry set























The marginal costs in the traded goods sector equal MCH = W=AH. Foreign traded goods ￿rms
set their prices similarly. Note that wholesale prices set by traded goods ￿rms depend both
on their marginal costs and on the price of non-tradables. The reason is that the necessity to
combine traded and nontraded goods implicitly lowers the demand elasticity for traded goods
and increases the markup. Combining equation (21) with (19) and assuming that ￿ equals ￿
￿










Note that if ￿ > 0, retail and wholesale prices for the same good may di⁄er across countries.
Hence, the law of one price does not hold at the wholesale and retail levels. Moreover, (22)
indicate that markups are responsive to shocks in the nontraded sector.






Since both wholesale and retail prices of traded goods are in￿ uenced by nontraded goods prices,
this de￿nition allows us to isolate price variations that originate in the tradables sector. Finally,
the real exchange rate is de￿ned to be Q ￿ SP
￿
P ￿i.e. an increase of Q re￿ ects a real depreciation.
82.5 Equilibrium and steady state conditions
The optimality and market clearing conditions are used to determine the endogenous variables
in equilibrium ￿in particular, the portfolio share ￿. The rational expectations equilibrium is a
set of values for relative consumption, output, labor, real wages, prices and the optimal portfolio
share, given the distribution of shocks fAH;A￿
F;AN;A￿
Ng. The model is solved by log-linearizing
around the symmetric steady state where AH = A
￿
F = AN = A
￿
N = 1.
The steady state ratio of the nontraded goods price over the (retail) price of traded goods is
given by ￿ ￿
￿ PN
￿ PT = ￿￿1
(1+￿)￿￿1 ￿ 1. If ￿ = 0 ￿i.e. if there are no distribution costs ￿it follows
that ￿ = 1 and ￿ PN = ￿ PT. Once ￿ > 0, ￿ is smaller than one. This is because ￿as shown in (22)
￿the retail price of traded goods exceeds its ￿markup price￿by ￿￿=(￿ ￿ 1)PN.
The steady-state ratio of nontraded goods ￿rms￿to traded goods ￿rms￿pro￿ts is given by
￿N
￿H = ! + ￿￿ with ! ￿
1￿￿
￿ ￿1￿￿ > 0. If ￿ = 0, this ratio only depends on the weights
of nontraded and traded goods in agents￿consumption aggregator. Whether the existence of
distribution costs raises or reduces this expression depends on ￿, the elasticity of substitution
between traded and nontraded goods: if ￿ > 1, a higher value of ￿ raises ￿N=￿H both because
the need to combine traded goods with retail services raises the demand for nontraded goods
at given prices, and because the higher relative price of traded goods shifts demand towards
nontradables. By contrast, if ￿ < 1 the e⁄ect is ambiguous since consumers￿demand reaction to
increasing tradables prices is less pronounced.
The (retail) value of domestic traded goods production relative to domestic nominal spending
is given by ￿T ￿ PHY H=PC = 1=(1 + !) while the value of domestic nontradables production
relative to domestic spending is ￿N ￿ PNY N=PC = (! + ￿￿)=(1 + !). Without distribution
costs, these ratios are ￿ and (1 ￿ ￿), respectively. With positive distribution costs, ￿T < ￿ if
￿ > 1 while ￿T > ￿ if ￿ < 1. By contrast, the e⁄ect of ￿ on ￿N = (1￿￿T)+￿￿￿T is ambiguous:
steady state revenues of nontraded goods ￿rms are a⁄ected by the fact that these ￿rms charge a
lower price (the ￿rst part of the equation). At the same time, however, they meet higher demand
at given prices since every traded good that is sold is associated with ￿ units of the (composite)
nontraded good (the second part of the equation).
Finally, the steady-state share of total pro￿ts in agents￿income equals ￿=PC = (1+￿￿￿T)=￿.
The share of labor income is WL=PC = 1￿(1+￿￿￿T)=￿. While the former expression is strictly
increasing in ￿, the latter is strictly falling. This is an important result: by lowering the e⁄ective
elasticity of demand for traded goods and by increasing the demand for nontraded goods at given
prices, the necessity to use retail services raises the share of agents￿spending that is ￿nanced
out of pro￿t income while it reduces the importance of labor income.
92.6 Calibration
We will later compute the equilibrium portfolio share ￿ for varying sets of parameter values.
The parameters that enter our benchmark calibration are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Benchmark Parameters
Parameters Values
￿ Elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods 0.9
￿ Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign traded goods 1.5
￿ Elasticity of substitution between varieties 7.0
￿ Units of non-tradables required for delivering tradables 0.8
￿ Degree of relative risk aversion 2.0
￿ Preference for tradables 0.5
a Preference for domestic tradables 0.53
Standard estimates for ￿, the elasticity of substitution between traded and nontraded goods,
vary between 0.44 (Tesar and Stockman, 1995) and 1.2 (Ostry and Reinhart, 1992). We choose
the midway and set ￿ equal to 0.9 which is, in fact, only slightly higher than the estimate provided
in Mendoza (1991). The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables ￿ equals
1.5 and is based on the estimate by Backus et al. (1994), a widely used value in open economy
macro studies. In the sensitivity analysis carried out later on, we will also account for the recent
contribution by Imbs and Mejean (2008). They reconcile estimates for ￿ in macro studies with
those based on micro-level data and suggest considerably higher values for ￿ than 1.5.
The elasticity of substitution between varieties of a good (￿) is set to 7 (Corsetti et al.,
2008b), which implies a steady state markup of 16 percent in the nontraded goods sectors.
The calibration is thus in line with Oliveira Martins et al. (1996), who ￿nd markups generally
ranging between 10 and 35 percent. In the presence of distribution costs, the assumption of
identical elasticities of substitution across sectors implies that the steady state markup for the
traded goods sector is above the markup in the nontraded goods sector. Its size depends on the
value chosen for ￿, the amount of non-tradables services required for the delivery of a unit of
a tradable good to consumers. According to evidence provided in Burstein et al. (2003), the
distribution margin in retail prices for US tradables ranges between 40 and 50 percent. These
￿gures are broadly con￿rmed by the empirical analysis in Goldberg and Campa (2010) who
document distribution margins between 30 and 50 percent of purchaser prices for a sample of
twenty-one OECD countries. We follow these ￿ndings and set ￿ to 0.8 which corresponds to a
distribution margin (￿￿￿100) of around 40 percent of retail prices. Accordingly, the markup in
the traded goods sector amounts to 32 percent over marginal costs.
The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ￿ equals 2 (see Backus et al., 1994). The preference
10of the domestic representative household for tradables, ￿, is picked such that it corresponds to
a steady-state share of non-tradables in GDP of 60 per cent. This ratio, in turn, is based on
the worldwide service to GDP ratio which was, according to the World Development Indicators
(WDI), around 65 per cent on average between 1990 and 2006. By subtracting 5 percent we
account for the fact that some services are indeed tradable. Note, that in the presence of a
distribution sector, the weight of non-tradables in the consumption basket (1 ￿ ￿) is smaller
than the (adjusted) service share because a part of the demand for non-tradables stems from
the household￿ s demand for tradable goods.4 The more units of retail services are required for
the delivery of one unit of tradables to consumers, i.e. the higher the distribution margin, the
smaller is the implied weight of non-tradables in consumption.
The preference for domestic tradables a is chosen to match an import-to-GDP ratio of 25
per cent, which is in line with WDI data for high income OECD countries between 1990 and
2006 and includes imports of services. Note that in the presence of a distribution sector con-
sumers purchase tradables at retail prices while imports are recorded at wholesale prices, which
di⁄er from consumer prices by the distribution margin. Moreover, the ratio between prices for
traded and nontraded goods, ￿, is not equal to one in the steady state. Hence, unlike in many
other models, (1 ￿ a), the household￿ s preference for imported tradables, does not simply equal
Import Share
￿ . With a given import share, a increases in the weight of tradables in the aggregate
consumption basket ￿ which is, amongst others, dependent on the size of distribution costs.
Interestingly, this procedure yields a value of 0.53, i.e. our benchmark calibration implies almost
no home bias in traded goods consumption.
3 The optimal portfolio share of domestic equities
3.1 Financial and non￿nancial income and the real exchange rate
In this section we derive the optimal share of domestic equities in domestic agents￿portfolio
(￿). We denote b X as a variable￿ s percentage deviation from its steady-state level ￿ X: b X =
lnX￿ln ￿ X ￿ (X￿ ￿ X)= ￿ X, approximated up to ￿rst-order. We take a second-order approximation
of (9), which relates the covariance between domestic returns and domestic nominal spending to
the covariance between excess returns and the real exchange rate:5
E0[(b ￿ ￿ d S￿￿)(￿d PC)] =
1 ￿ ￿
￿
E0[(b ￿ ￿ d S￿￿) b Q]: (24)
4For more details, also for the preference parameter a, see part 2 of the appendix.
5We relate the portfolio share to di⁄erences between domestic and foreign variables. Thus, the magnitutes of
domestic spending, pro￿ts and labor incomes, are always understood relative to their foreign counterparts.
11The di⁄erence between domestic and foreign nominal expenditures on consumption, i.e. ￿excess￿
domestic nominal spending, is denoted by ￿d PC ￿ d PC￿ \ SP￿C￿ and depends on ￿nancial income
generated by total pro￿ts in the domestic economy and non￿nancial (labor) income, respectively.
To see this more clearly consider the budget constraint (6) whose log-linear approximation is
￿d PC = (2￿ ￿ 1)￿b YFin + ￿b Y Non




(b ￿ ￿ d S￿￿) and (26)
￿b Y Non
Fin = (1 ￿
1 + ￿￿￿T
￿
)(d WL ￿ \ SW￿L￿): (27)
Equation (25) shows that non￿nancial income directly a⁄ects agents￿consumption, while the
portfolio share ￿ determines to what extent consumption is in￿ uenced by domestic ￿nancial







E0[￿b YFin b Q]
E0[(￿b YFin)2]
￿




This equation shows that the optimal share of domestic equities (￿) in agents￿portfolio depends
on three components: The covariance between domestic ￿nancial income ￿b YFin and the real ex-
change rate b Q, the covariance between non￿nancial (labor) income ￿b Y Non
Fin and ￿nancial (pro￿t)
income as well as the variance of domestic ￿nancial income.
If the real exchange rate ￿ uctuates ￿be it because there is a home bias in traded goods
consumption or because some goods are nontraded ￿ the expression E0[￿b YFin b Q] may di⁄er
from zero. Risk averse investors (￿ > 1) have an incentive to insure against "real exchange rate
risk". Domestic equities are a good hedge against this risk if domestic ￿rms￿pro￿ts are high
whenever the domestic price level is high, i.e. the real exchange rate appreciates. In this case
the covariance E0[￿b YFin b Q] is negative, and the optimal share of domestic equities increases.
This e⁄ect is o⁄-set by the incentive of households to hedge their non-diversi￿able labor
income, ￿b Y Non
Fin . When domestic ￿nancial income is positively correlated with the household￿ s
non￿nancial income, i.e. E0[￿b YFin￿b Y Non
Fin ] > 0, that is, if the return on domestic assets is high
when labor incomes are high as well, households have an incentive to hedge this risk by purchasing
foreign equities such that ￿ decreases. For our model and benchmark parameterization, this will
indeed be the case. Thus, the second expression puts us into an unfavorable starting position to
explain equity home bias since the non-diversi￿able labor income theoretically raises the incentive
to purchase foreign equity (see Baxter and Jermann 1997).6 A lower variance of ￿nancial income,
6Note, that we consider an economy with ￿exible prices and wages. Engel and Matsumoto (2009) show that
in the presence of nominal rigidities ￿nancial and labor incomes may be negatively correlated. In this case, labor
income risk reinforces the bias towards domestic equities arising from the desire to hedge against real exchange
risk.
12E0[(￿b YFin)2], magni￿es both e⁄ects. In what follows, we will explore how distribution costs
a⁄ect the covariance and variance terms in (28).
3.2 Relative pro￿ts and prices
Fluctuations of ￿b YFinand ￿b Y Non
Fin are driven by technology shocks in the traded and nontraded
goods sectors. These shocks a⁄ect the di⁄erent types of income through their impact on relative
pro￿ts and prices. Consider ￿rst ￿nancial income, which can also be written as
￿b YFin =
[￿T(b ￿H ￿ c S￿
￿





i.e. as a function of pro￿ts in the traded and the nontraded goods sectors.7 A larger value of
the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent varieties of the composite traded/nontraded good
(￿) reduces ￿rms￿markup and therefore lowers the importance of pro￿ts in agents￿total income.
The elasticities of ￿nancial income with respect to traded and nontraded goods ￿rms￿pro￿ts are
given by ￿T and ￿N, respectively. We can rewrite non￿nancial income as
￿b Y Non
Fin = (￿ ￿ 1)f￿^ YFin +
￿T (￿ ￿ 1)[(b ￿H ￿ c S￿
￿
F) ￿ ￿(￿￿ ^ PN + ^ ￿)]
￿
g; (30)
with ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ 2a = 0 if there is neither a home bias nor a foreign bias in consumption (a = 0:5),
and ￿ < 0 if domestic traded goods have a greater weight in agents￿utility function (a > 0:5).
Moreover, ^ ￿ represents variations in the terms of trade (de￿ned on the basis of relative marginal
costs) while ￿ ^ PN ￿ c PN ￿ [ SP￿
N re￿ ects variations in relative nontraded goods￿prices.
Equation (30) shows that ￿nancial and non￿nancial income are perfectly correlated if there
are no distribution costs (i.e. if ￿ = 1). In this case, E0[￿b YFin ￿ ￿b Y Non
Fin ]=E0[￿b Y 2
Fin] = ￿ ￿ 1.
Letting ￿ rise above zero reduces ￿ and activates the second term in curled brackets. This neatly
illustrates that accounting for distribution costs also a⁄ects agents￿portfolio choice through its
impact on the covariance between ￿nancial and non￿nancial income.
Given (29) and (30) we relate pro￿ts in the traded and the nontraded goods sector in more
detail to relative prices and the value of nominal spending:





2)(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
2(1 ￿ ￿T)
￿
b ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿T)￿ c PNg ￿ ￿￿d PC;





￿[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿T)](￿b ￿ + ￿ c PN) + ￿d PC: (31)
The terms of trade, b ￿, and the relative nontraded goods price, ￿ c PN, can be related to the
underlying shocks by invoking the production function (7) as well as (23):
b ￿ = ￿￿d PC + (￿ ￿ 1) b Q ￿ (d AH ￿ c A￿
F) and ￿ c PN = ￿￿d PC + (￿ ￿ 1) b Q ￿ (d AN ￿ d A￿
N): (32)
7More details are given in part 3 and 4 of the Technical Appendix.
13Note that an increase in b ￿ re￿ ects an ￿improvement￿ of the terms of trade. An increase in
domestic consumption raises the domestic real wage and thus the terms of trade by reducing
labor supply. For ￿ > 1, a real depreciation also raises the terms of trade through its e⁄ect
on the nominal wage. Finally, a favorable technology shock reduces costs and prices and thus
"worsens" the terms of trade. The relative price of nontraded goods follows the same logic.
The real exchange rate is related to the underlying tradables and non-tradables prices by
b Q = ￿￿T￿b ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿T￿)￿ c PN: (33)
The terms of trade do not a⁄ect the real exchange rate if there is no home bias in traded
consumption (￿ = 0). If ￿ < 0 a rise of the terms of trade results in a real appreciation. If there
are distribution costs, ￿ < 1, the impact of ￿ uctuations in nontraded goods prices on the real
exchange rate is reinforced while the impact of the terms of trade is dampened.
3.3 Understanding the e⁄ect of distribution costs
Equations (29)￿ (33) in combination with (28) hold the key for understanding the in￿ uence of
distribution costs on agents￿portfolio choice. We start by analyzing a very simple special case:
suppose that there are no distribution costs (￿ = 0 and ￿ = 1), that all goods are tradable (￿ = 1)
and that there is no home bias in consumption (a = 0:5 and ￿ = 0). In this scenario, the real
exchange rate is constant and there is no need to use equity to hedge real exchange rate risk (i.e.
E0[￿b YFin b Q] = 0). Combining this with the fact that E0[￿b YFin￿b Y Non
Fin ]=E0[(￿b YFin)2] = (￿￿1)
if ￿ = 0 and substituting these results into (28) yields




This expression has a straightforward interpretation: the higher the elasticity of substitution
between individual variants (￿), the smaller the markup of monopolistic ￿rms, the higher the
share of wages in total income, and the higher the portfolio position households need to hold in
order to insure themselves against labor income risk.
Once we introduce nontraded goods, but abstract from a home bias in traded goods con-
sumption ￿i.e. ￿ < 1 but ￿ = 0 ￿real exchange rate risk emerges as a possible reason to
purchase home equities. In this case, we have
b ￿H ￿ c S￿
￿
Fj￿=0 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)b ￿; (35)





￿[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿T)]￿ c PN + ￿d PC; (36)
￿b Y Non
Fin j￿=0 = (￿ ￿ 1)[￿^ YFin +
￿
1 ￿ ￿





b Qj￿=0 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿T)￿ c PN: (38)
14Equation (35) illustrates that, with ￿ = 0, pro￿ts in the tradables sector only depend on the
terms of trade ￿with an ￿improvement￿of the terms of trade raising (reducing) pro￿ts if ￿,
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign traded goods, is lower (greater) than
one. Since ￿ < 1 for ￿ > 0, positive distribution costs dampen the in￿ uence of terms-of-trade
variations. This is because retail prices of tradables not only depend on marginal costs, but also
on the price of retail services.
The in￿ uence of positive distribution costs on the elasticity of nontraded goods pro￿ts with
respect to changes in ￿ c PN is harder to determine and depends on the size of the elasticity of
substitution between traded and nontraded goods, ￿: Equation (36) shows that if ￿ = 0 and
￿ = 1 pro￿ts are una⁄ected by movements in relative nontraded goods prices. Consequently,
real exchange rate movements, induced by ￿ c PN, cannot be insured by purchasing equities. If
￿ = 0 and ￿ < 1, the reaction in spending on non-tradables that follows an increase in ￿ c PN is
positive, so that ￿b YFin increases. In this case purchasing domestic equities provides a hedge
against real exchange rate risk. Once ￿ > 0, the positive e⁄ect of an increase in ￿ c PN on ￿b YFin
is ampli￿ed.8 By contrast, if ￿ = 0 and ￿ > 1 the reaction of nontradable pro￿ts that follows
an increase in ￿ c PN is negative. Once ￿ > 0, however, the negative e⁄ect of an increase in ￿ c PN
on nontradable pro￿ts is mitigated. Thus, the need to utilise distribution services reinforces the
correlation between domestic pro￿ts and nontraded goods prices. This is because the presence
of a retail sector implicitly reduces the elasticity of demand for nontraded goods.
The observation that distribution costs limit consumers￿scope for ￿escaping￿ increases in
nontraded goods prices holds the key for understanding our results: the existence of distribution
costs not only increases the de-facto share of nontraded goods in GDP, but also a⁄ects the
pricing behavior of traded goods ￿rms and thus enhances the correlation between nontraded
goods prices and pro￿ts.
Equation (37) shows, once more, that ￿nancial and non￿nancial income are perfectly corre-
lated if ￿ = 0 (and thus ￿ = 1). Once there are positive distribution costs, the second term in
(37) is no longer zero. Whether it raises or reduces the covariance between ￿b YFin and ￿b Y Non
Fin
depends on the variance of pro￿ts in the traded goods sector and the covariance between pro￿ts
in the traded and the nontraded goods sectors, respectively. Since the elasticity of demand for
nontraded goods declines as distribution costs grow larger, the latter term in (37) might become
positive, so that the covariance between ￿b YFin and ￿b Y Non
Fin would decline.
Finally, it follows from equation (38) that terms of trade movements do not in￿ uence the
real exchange rate while ￿ uctuations in nontraded goods prices have an even stronger impact on
8This holds as long as the distribution margin ￿￿ >
(￿￿1)￿T !
(1+(￿￿1)￿T !).
15the real exchange rate if ￿ > 0. This is not surprising: an increase in nontradables prices has a
direct and an indirect e⁄ect on the domestic price level, with the indirect e⁄ect running via the
retail price of nontraded goods.
Several conclusions emerge: ￿rst, the presence of distribution costs alters the correlation
between ￿nancial and non￿nancial income. A higher value of ￿ potentially reduces agents￿
incentive to hedge labor income risk by investing abroad. Conversely, the importance to diversify
real exchange rate risk increases. As equations (35) and (36) indicate, distribution costs raise
the importance of nontraded goods prices for agents￿￿nancial income. Since these prices also
dominate variations in the real exchange rate ￿and since this in￿ uence is magni￿ed if ￿ > 0 ￿
the correlation between ￿nancial income and the real exchange rate increases. This provides an
incentive to purchase home equities and shifts ￿ above the value given by (34).
To see this more clearly, consider the case where productivity shocks in the traded and
nontraded goods sectors are identical. Thus, we allow for only two di⁄erent shocks (at home
and abroad). Since households have access to two equity-type assets, the spanning condition
is satis￿ed and international ￿nancial markets are (locally) complete. Under internationally






From (39) and (35)￿ (38) households incentive to insure against "real exchange rate risk" equals






while the incentive to hedge non-diversi￿able labor income is driven by
E0[￿b YFin￿b Y Non
Fin ]
E0[(￿b YFin)2]
j￿=0 = (￿ ￿ 1) +
(￿ ￿ 1)
￿
￿T (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿￿b YFin
, with (41)
￿￿b YFinj￿=0 = ￿T




￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿T).
For the benchmark parameter speci￿cation in table (1) the expressions in (40) and (41) are
both greater than zero if there are no distribution costs (￿ = 0), as shown in ￿gure 1. Conse-
quently, households would like to allocate a large portion of their wealth to foreign equities. This
is a result one would expect. Consider for example a negative domestic productivity disturbance,
which raises domestic prices. This causes domestic output and, hence, pro￿ts to decline. As
domestic output is low, the real exchange rate appreciates due to the relative lower supply of
domestic goods in the world economy. As a consequence, domestic pro￿ts and the real exchange
rate are positively correlated, as shown in the left graph of Figure 1. Since labour income is
positively correlated with domestic pro￿ts, as shown in the right graph of Figure 1, households
16have an incentive to diversify their labour income. Thus, we should expect a portfolio choice
towards foreign equities.
However, once distribution costs become strictly positive, both the covariance between ￿nan-
cial income and the real exchange rate and the covariance between ￿nancial and non￿nancial
income change. Positive distribution costs limit households possibility to "escape" the increase
in domestic prices since distribution costs reduce the demand elasticity. This has positive ef-
fects on domestic pro￿ts. Consequently, the correlation between domestic pro￿ts and the real
exchange rate turns negative and E0[￿b YFin b Q]=E0[(￿b YFin)2] < 0, as illustrated by the left graph
of Figure 1.




































































































































Figure 1: Covariance Variance Ratios
The right graph of Figure 1 shows that the expression in (41), though still positive, declines
as ￿ becomes larger. Distribution costs amplify the correlation between pro￿ts in the traded
and the nontraded goods sectors. This mitigates the incentive to hedge labour income risk.
Hence, distribution costs a⁄ect agents￿portfolio choice by reducing the incentive to hedge labor
income risk and by enhancing the incentive to hedge real exchange rate risk ￿with the latter
motive becoming less important as ￿ grows large. This is an interesting ￿nding in the light of
the discussion raised by van Wincoop and Warnock (2010).
In the preceding paragraphs we have focused on the special case where consumers do not
have a preference for domestic traded goods (a = 0:5). However, in section 2.5 we have argued
that the data suggest a ￿albeit weak ￿home bias in traded goods consumption. Once ￿ < 0,
the covariances between ￿nancial income and real exchange rate as well as non￿nancial income,
respectively, are more complicated terms, but the qualitative properties do not change by much.9
Figure 2 depicts ￿ as a function of ￿ for the benchmark parameters from table (1). For realistic
distribution margins of around of 40 percent, i.e. ￿ = 0:8, the model yields a very weak home
9See part 5 of the Technical Appendix for the case of ￿ < 0.
17bias in equity holdings. Domestic households allocate around 53 percent (￿￿100) of their initial
wealth to domestic equity.
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Figure 2: Distribution Costs and the Share of Domestic Equities
in Domestic Portfolios (Complete Markets)
3.4 The incomplete markets case
3.4.1 Solving for the optimal portfolio share
Real-word asset markets do not appear to be complete and the Backus-Smith condition in (39)
is often found to be violated by the data (see Obstfeld, 2007). We therefore proceed by relaxing
the assumption that productivity shocks in the traded and nontraded goods sectors are identical.
Thus, since there are four di⁄erent shocks while households have access to only two equity-type
assets, the spanning condition is not satis￿ed, and international ￿nancial markets are incomplete.
We can write nominal spending, ￿nancial and non￿nancial income as a function of the underlying
technology shocks. To do so we treat the "portfolio based" ￿nancial income as exogenous and
de￿ne
￿b Y Ex
Fin = (2￿ ￿ 1)￿b YFin, with (42)
￿b YFin = ￿￿A + ￿￿
￿
￿b Y Ex





Fin = ￿LA + ￿L￿b Y Ex
Fin; (44)
where ￿￿ and ￿L are (1x2) vectors whose elements are functions of the model￿ s parameters,
￿￿ and ￿L are scalars, and A0 = [(d AH ￿ c A￿
F);(d AN ￿ d A￿
N)] is a (1x2) vector of sector-speci￿c
18technology shocks.10 Combining (43) and (44) yields
￿b YFin = R1￿b Y Ex
Fin + R2A; (45)




b Q = D1￿b Y Ex
Fin + D2A; (46)
which contrasts the Backus-Smith condition in (39). D1 is a scalar and D2 is a 1x2 vector. Now
we recognize that ￿b Y Ex
Fin rather than being exogenous is determined by (42), and (2￿ ￿ 1) is















H + D2 are 1x2 vectors, and
￿ is the 2x2 covariance matrix of the exogenous productivity disturbances in the traded and










the solution to the share of domestic equities in domestic agents￿portfolio (see Devereux and
Sutherland, 2006). With (47) in hand we can discuss the implications of distribution costs for
the home bias in equities when international asset markets are incomplete.
3.4.2 Numerical results
The variance and covariance of shocks Once we drop the complete markets assumption we
have to make an assumption on the variance and covariance of the productivity shocks. Working
with several alternatives we found that the results were qualitatively and quantitatively very
similar. We chose to follow Coeurdacier (2009) and set the correlations of shocks within a
country to 0.3. Moreover we set all variances equal to one, thus assuming that the volatility of
productivity shocks is equal across sectors and countries.
The role of distribution costs for the equity home bias Figure 3 illustrates how varying
the size of distribution costs a⁄ects the share of domestic equities in the portfolio of domestic
households. If ￿ = 0, i.e. if there are no distribution costs, domestic households hold a large
short position in domestic equities. As ￿ increases, the share of domestic equities in the domestic
portfolio initially rises quite rapidly, before it eventually starts to decrease again. However, even
with very large values of ￿, ￿ is above zero and considerably higher than the position households
would choose to hold if there were no distribution costs. When the distribution margin is 40%
(￿ = 0:8) the percentage share of domestic equities in the overall portfolio (￿￿100) equals around
75%, as shown in Figure 3.
10Details are given in part 6 of the Technical Appendix.
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Figure 3: Distribution Costs and the Share of Domestic
Equities in Domestic Portfolios (Incomplete Markets)
To understand the e⁄ect of ￿ on ￿ we go back to the analysis in Section 3.3. There we have
shown that, in a model without nontraded goods, without distribution costs and without a home
bias in consumption, agents￿portfolio choice is driven by their goal to hedge labor income risk
and only hinges on ￿. Substituting our benchmark choice of ￿ = 7 into equation (34) yields
￿ = ￿2:5. In our benchmark parameterization, nontraded goods enter the utility function with
the same weight as traded goods (￿ = 0:5), and consumers￿preferences are slightly biased towards
domestic goods (a = 0.53). Both aspects give rise to real exchange rate ￿ uctuations and thus
possibly provide an incentive to hedge the associated risk. Note, however, that since our choice
of the parameter a is close to 0.5, there is almost no home bias in consumption, and variations
in ^ Q are predominantly driven by nontraded goods prices. In interpreting our numerical results
we will therefore focus on the special case (￿ = 0) as characterized by equations (35) to (38).
As shown in equation (28), the optimal value of ￿ increases if E0[￿^ YFin ^ Q] < 0. The left
column of Figure 4 indicates that for the incomplete markets case this expression is negative for
all values of ￿. In this case, an increase of nontraded goods prices raises pro￿ts in the domestic
nontraded goods sector and reduces ^ Q, i.e. it results in a real appreciation. Hence, even without
distribution costs, ￿^ YFin and ^ Q systematically move in opposite directions, and there is some
scope for real exchange rate risk hedging via domestic equities. However, the motive of labor
income hedging still plays a predominant role for optimal portfolio choice: The short position
shown for ￿ = 0 in Figure 3 is less pronounced than in the simplest reference case described by
20(34), but the result for ￿ is still far away from a home bias in equities.



































































































































Figure 4: Covariance Relationships
Once distribution costs become strictly positive, the covariance between the real exchange
rate and domestic ￿nancial income remains negative. Since a is close to 0.5 our interpretation
is, again, based on equations (35) to (38).11 First, as demonstrated in Subsection 2.4, raising ￿
increases the importance of pro￿ts in ￿nancing domestic consumption and therefore reinforces
the impact of any shock that causes a variation in pro￿ts. Second, while positive distribution
costs dampen the e⁄ect of terms of trade ￿ uctuations on traded goods pro￿ts, they enhance the
in￿ uence of ￿ ^ PN on nontraded-goods pro￿ts. This is due to the fact that ￿ > 0 increases the
demand for nontraded goods at given prices. Moreover ￿as shown by (36) ￿higher nontraded
goods prices unambiguously increase the respective ￿rms￿pro￿ts if the elasticity of substitution
between traded and nontraded goods (￿) is smaller than one. As a result, both ￿^ YFin and ^ Q
are dominated by ￿ uctuations in nontraded goods prices if ￿ > 0, and this results in a negative
value of E0[￿b YFin b Q].
In addition, raising ￿ a⁄ects the covariance between ￿^ YFin and ￿^ Y Non
Fin (see equation 37).
Whether this covariance increases or decreases relative to the benchmark value of (￿￿1) depends
on how the variance of pro￿ts in the traded goods sector and the covariance between traded and
nontraded goods pro￿ts are in￿ uenced by distribution costs. If the latter covariance is negative,
E0[￿b YFin￿b Y Non
Fin ] may, in principle, increase in ￿. However, for our benchmark calibration, the
covariance between ￿nancial and non-￿nancial income is a non-monotonic function of distribution
costs. The right column of Figure 4 shows that this function decreases for small values of ￿, then
increases, and eventually decreases again in the ￿relevant range￿￿i.e. for values of ￿ in the
neighborhood of 0.8. This illustrates that, especially for realistic values of ￿, the home bias
in equities is not just driven by raising the correlation between domestic returns and the real
11In fact, as we will show below, choosing higher values of a has almost no e⁄ect on ￿ if ￿ > 0.
21exchange rate - a mechanism that has recently been criticized by van Wincoop and Warnock
(2010) - but also by reducing the covariance between domestic ￿nancial and non￿nancial income.
Stability Analysis It is the transmission of shocks to relative pro￿ts, labor income and the
real exchange rate that is crucial for the understanding of agents￿portfolio choice. The response
to shock-induced changes in relative prices depends on the response of consumers to these price
changes and on the relative importance of the goods within aggregate consumption baskets.
Hence, the value of ￿ changes if we vary the parameters characterizing households￿preferences.
However, as we will show, the reaction of ￿ to such parameter changes is much less dramatic if
￿ > 0 than in a scenario without distribution costs.
We ￿rst examine the sensitivity of agents￿portfolio choice to varying weights in the consump-
tion baskets. Figure 5 illustrates the impact of ￿ on ￿, keeping most parameters as de￿ned in
Table 1, but allowing for di⁄erent values of ￿.














Figure 5: The Share of Domestic Equities as a Function of
Tradables in the Aggregate Consumption Basket
An increase in the preference for tradables generally lowers the optimal portfolio share of
domestic equities, irrespective of whether distribution costs are accounted for or not. The reason
for the negative impact of ￿ on ￿ is easy to see: The higher ￿, i.e. the higher the importance of
tradables relative to non-tradables in households￿consumption baskets, the weaker the response
of the real exchange rate to changes in the relative nontraded price, and, thus, the lower the
importance of real exchange rate risk as compared to labor income risk. If the hedging of real
22exchange rate risk does not play an important role for the portfolio choice of households, it
is very likely that households choose to predominantly hold foreign equities. Interestingly, the
decline of ￿ is much steeper for ￿ = 0.12 With ￿ = 0:8, ￿ does not take on values below zero.
Even more importantly, as long as there are some nontraded goods in the overall consumption
basket households will go long in domestic equities. By contrast, when ￿ is zero, households
start to go short in domestic equities for relatively small values of ￿, and a home bias in equity
holdings only emerges if the share of nontraded goods in agents￿consumption basket is assumed
to be unrealistically large (greater than 90 percent). These observations demonstrate that the
role of distribution costs goes beyond just increasing the de-facto share of nontraded goods in
an economy. As argued above, the existence of distribution costs changes ￿rms￿pricing behavior
and the relative importance of ￿nancial and non￿nancial income. As a result, the variable ￿ is
greater than 0:5 even if the share of nontraded goods in GDP is a (reasonable) 60 percent.
Figure 6 demonstrates the impact of variations in a on ￿. We allow a to vary in a range
between 0.5 and 1, as a foreign consumption bias is rather unrealistic.

















Figure 6: The Share of Domestic Equities as a Function of
Domestic Tradables in the Tradables Consumption Basket
Apparently, ￿ is extremely sensitive to variations in a when ￿ = 0, while it is almost invariant
and greater than 0.5 once ￿ is set to 0.8. With a greater bias in traded goods consumption, terms
of trade ￿ uctuations play an increasingly important role in the context of real exchange rate
hedging. The higher a, the stronger the (negative) impact of a ￿terms-of-trade improvement￿on
12Distribution costs obviously do not play a role, when ￿ is zero, as in this case there are no tradables. It is
then optimal for agents to invest all their wealth in domestic equities.
23the real exchange rate. Generally, if a is greater than 0.5, relative pro￿ts respond to price changes
of both tradables and non-tradables, with the direction of the e⁄ect crucially depending on the
elasticities of substitution ￿ and ￿. For our benchmark parameterization and ￿ = 0, a higher
value of a ￿rst enhances the incentive to purchase foreign assets, leading to unrealistically large
short positions in domestic equities as a approaches 0.9. For larger values of a, the covariance of
￿nancial income and the real exchange rate turns strongly negative and ￿ takes on an implausibly
high value. With a (reasonable) distribution margin of around 40 per cent, by contrast, terms
of trade movements play a signi￿cantly smaller role for both the dynamics of the real exchange
rate and of relative pro￿ts. Hence, the extent of the bias is less decisive for portfolio choice and,
for given parameter values, ￿ is almost invariant in a.
Figure 7 displays equilibrium domestic equity shares as a function of ￿. ￿, again, is subject
to dramatic swings for the case without distribution costs.

















Figure 7: The Share of Domestic Equities as a Function of the
Elasticity of Substitution Between Tradables
For ￿ = 1, domestic households are extremely biased towards domestic equities, while they
choose to hold a large short position in domestic equities when ￿ is slightly above unity and
higher. This result re￿ ects the importance of labor income risk in the tradables sector for the
portfolio choice of households. Remember from (35) that, when ￿ = ￿ = 0, relative pro￿ts in the
tradables sector are extremely dependent on the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign tradables. By contrast, ￿ does not show up in equations (36) and (38), which characterize
the reaction of pro￿ts in the non-tradables sector and of the real exchange rate. Furthermore
24remember from (37) that pro￿ts and labor incomes are perfectly correlated in the tradables
sector if ￿ = ￿ = 0. Obviously, the degree of labor income risk arising in the tradables sector
depends on ￿, while the real exchange rate is independent from ￿. Now consider the case, where
￿ is unity. Equations (35) and (37) show that relative pro￿ts and relative labor incomes (in
the traded goods sector) are not responsive to terms of trade ￿ uctuations. This is, essentially,
the ￿nding in Cole and Obstfeld (1991) who highlighted the role of relative price adjustment
as a potential risk-sharing mechanism. It follows that the position households choose to hold
in this special case is purely motivated by their desire to hedge against real exchange rate risk
and labor income risk that arise from ￿ uctuations in the relative nontraded goods price. The
resulting portfolio choice crucially depends on the value of ￿. Since our benchmark value of ￿ is
smaller than one, households ￿nd it optimal to hold a long position in domestic equities. As ￿
takes on values below or above unity, the picture changes dramatically. This rapid change in the
sign of the domestic equity position is only due to the arising labor income risk in the tradables
sector which motivates households to purchase foreign equities. As pro￿ts and labor incomes are
a⁄ected in the same way for any value of ￿, while the real exchange rate is not in￿ uenced by the
value for ￿, the optimal portfolio share is almost invariant to values of ￿ di⁄erent from unity.
For ￿ = 0:8, the range of values ￿ takes on is not as broad as for ￿ = 0. However, there is
only a rather small range of ￿ values for which the model can generate a realistic home bias in
equity holdings. This range includes the value we assigned to ￿ in our benchmark calibration
and it should be emphasized that this value is not arbitrarily chosen but rather commonly used
in the literature. If there are distribution costs, the vulnerability of relative labor incomes in
the tradables sector with regards to terms of trade ￿ uctuations also depends on ￿, as shown by
(37). This link, however, is dampened because terms of trade ￿ uctuations become less important
for the dynamics of relative labor incomes if ￿ < 1. As a consequence, the position in foreign
equities held to hedge against labor income risk (in the tradables sector) is smaller than before.
In Figure 8 we vary the elasticity of substitution between tradables and non-tradables (￿).
For ￿ = 0:8, households exhibit a realistic equity home bias for values of ￿ between 0.7 and 1, as
can be seen in Figure 8. By contrast, without distribution costs households choose to go short
in domestic equities for any value of ￿. The short position becomes extremely large with high
values of ￿. This is due to the declining hedging quality of domestic equities with regard to real
exchange rate risk: the (negative) correlation between relative nontraded goods pro￿ts and the
real exchange rate becomes weaker as ￿ increases.
If ￿ is 0.8, households hold considerably larger positions in domestic equities, for a given value
of ￿ and ￿ increases as ￿ grows larger. The reason for this result - which is in stark contrast to
the scenario without distribution costs - is the fact that ! increases in ￿ if ￿>0. This raises the
25steady state ratio of nontraded to traded ￿rms￿pro￿ts and reduces ￿T (see section 2.5), which,
in turn, reinforces the correlation between domestic returns and the real exchange rate. As a
consequence, the equilibrium value of ￿ increases.
















Figure 8: The Share of Domestic Equities as a Function of the
Elasticity of Substitution between Tradables and Nontradables
4 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to explore the potential role of goods market frictions in explaining
the observed home bias in equity portfolios. In doing so, we focused on distribution costs as a
source of international price di⁄erences and real exchange rate ￿ uctuations. Moreover, instead of
assuming that equity payo⁄s originate in exogenous endowment shocks, we related these payo⁄s
to agents￿labor supply.
Our analysis yielded the following results: First, distribution costs do, indeed, help to explain
the high share of domestic equity in agents￿portfolios. When feeding our model with plausible
parameter values, we are able to replicate observed portfolio shares, i.e. a weight of domestic
equity in the range of 70 to 80 percent. Interestingly, this home bias emerges although a non-
diversi￿able labor income raises agents￿incentive to purchase foreign equities. Moreover, our
setup does not exhibit the dramatic sensitivity to small parameter variations that characterizes
models which trace international price di⁄erences back to iceberg-type trading costs.
We conclude that distribution costs are an important part of the picture when it comes to
explaining international portfolio choice. More importantly, their e⁄ect goes beyond just increas-
26ing the de-facto share of nontraded goods in GDP: by in￿ uencing e⁄ective demand elasticities
and thus ￿rms￿pricing behavior as well as the relative importance of pro￿t and labor income
in ￿nancing individuals￿consumption, the existence of distribution costs alters the covariances
between pro￿ts, the real exchange rate and labor income that determine agents￿portfolio choices.
Of course, this paper represents only a ￿rst step towards a more comprehensive analysis of
goods market structure and international portfolio choice. Our approach rested on a number
of simplifying assumptions, in particular with respect to the set of assets that are available to
investors. While we followed Coeurdacier (2009) in focusing on agents￿choice of equity ownership,
it remains to be shown how distribution costs a⁄ect portfolio choices when agents have access
to a broader menu of assets - in particular when, as emphasized by Coeurdacier and Gourinchas
(2009), internationally traded bonds o⁄er an alternative means to hedge real exchange rate risk.
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Technical Appendix
Part 1: Important steady state relationships
As the system is approximated around the steady state, it is useful to ￿rst clarify some steady
relationships between variables frequently utilized throughout the remainder of the appendix.
Goods Prices
An important assumption we make concerning steady state goods prices is that steady-state
technology parameters are identical across sectors and across countries ( ￿ AN = ￿ A￿
N = ￿ AH =
￿ A￿
F = ￿ A). This assumption has far-reaching consequences. First, as elasticities of substitution
between varieties (￿) are generally assumed to be identical in our model, prices for non-tradables
are equal across borders. Similarly, since markup prices for tradables ( ~ PMC
H ;S ~ P￿MC
F ) are also
identical for both types of tradables, the law of one price holds for traded goods on the wholesale
and on the retail level. Further note that, since we assume symmetric preferences, this implies
that consumer demand for domestic tradables in Home equals the demand of foreign consumers
29for tradables produced in their country. It follows that the representative consumption baskets
(aggregate and tradables only)in Home and Foreign are identical. Furthermore, the price index
for tradables equals the retail price for either home or foreign tradables and is identical in both







= ￿ S ￿ P￿
N = ￿ ~ PMC
H = ￿ S ~ P￿MC
F (48)






















￿ PH = ￿ PF = ￿ PT = ￿ S ￿ P￿
T (51)
￿ CH = ￿ C￿
F (52)
￿ CF = ￿ C￿
H (53)
￿ CT = ￿ C￿
T (54)
￿ C = ￿ C￿ (55)
￿ P = ￿ S ￿ P￿ (56)
Pro￿ts, Revenues, and Labor Incomes
If we de￿ne revenues in the domestic traded goods sector as ￿ Rev = ￿ ~ PH ￿ YH, make use of equation
(49) and take into account the production function of domestic tradable goods ￿rms, we get





By analogous reasoning, pro￿ts in the domestic nontraded goods sector can also be expressed as




￿ PN ￿ YN (58)
A further important steady-state relationship is the one between revenues and nominal aggregate






















































￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿(1￿￿)
￿ PC: (62)
Recalling that we de￿ned ! ￿
1￿￿





Combining equation (63) with equation (59), we get domestic pro￿ts in the tradables sector as





In order to derive steady state pro￿ts in the domestic non-tradables sector, we need to recall
how total demand for this type of goods is de￿ned:

















￿￿(￿￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿)
; (66)
we get
￿ PN ￿ YN =
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1￿￿) + ￿￿￿





Combining (67) with (58), we get pro￿ts in the domestic non-tradables sector as a function of




￿ P ￿ C: (68)
Equations (63), (67), (64), and (68) display revenues and pro￿ts in terms of steady state nominal
spending. Steady state labor incomes (in terms of consumption) can be easily derived by making
use of these equations as well as of the fact that labor incomes represent, per de￿nition, the
di⁄erence between revenues and pro￿ts:
￿ W ￿ LT =
(￿ ￿ 1)
￿
￿￿T ￿ P ￿ C; (69)





31Note that, due to our symmetry assumptions, the same relationships between pro￿ts, revenues,
labor incomes and nominal spending hold for the Foreign country.
Part 2: Matching ￿ and a to observables
We use the share of services in the steady state GDP as a basis for computing ￿. Here, the term
￿ services￿is used as an equivalent for non-tradables goods. The service share in the domestic
country (s) can be de￿ned as follows:
s =
￿ PN ￿ CN + ￿ ￿ PN( ￿ CH + ￿ CF)
￿ ~ PH( ￿ CH + ￿ C￿
H) + ￿ PN ￿ CN + ￿ ￿ PN( ￿ CH + ￿ CF)
: (72)
The following relationships hold in the steady state:
￿ CH = ￿ C￿
F;











Consequently we can write (72) as follows:
s =
￿ CN
( ￿ CH+ ￿ C￿
H) + ￿
￿ + 1 + ￿
￿￿1 +
￿ CN
( ￿ CH+ ￿ C￿
H)
: (73)
In addition note that:
￿ CN
















The service share can, thus, be written as follows:
s =
(1￿￿)
￿ ￿￿￿ + ￿







￿ ￿￿￿ + ￿)
￿￿








￿￿1 + 1 ￿ ￿)￿￿ + (1 ￿ s)
: (75)
32Our choice of a ￿the preference for domestically produced tradables ￿is based on the share of
import expenditures in GDP (e). In our model, this ratio is de￿ned as:
e =
￿ PF ￿ CF
￿ ~ PH( ￿ CH + ￿ C￿
H) + ￿ PN ￿ CN + ￿ ￿ PN( ￿ CH + ￿ CF)
: (76)































Solving for a gives the parameter as a function of the share of imports in expenditure to GDP
and of ￿:






Part 3: Log-linear approximation of the second-period budget con-
straint (￿d PC)
Domestic and foreign second-period budget constraints are given by equation (6) in the main
text. Using equations (64) and (68) from part 1 of the appendix we can write







F + ￿ ￿￿
N
￿ S ￿ P￿ ￿ C￿ :
Furthermore, using equations (69) and (70) we can write:





(￿￿T + ￿N) = 1 ￿
￿ ￿H + ￿ ￿N
￿ PC
=
￿ S ￿ W￿￿ L￿
T + ￿ S ￿ W￿￿ L￿
N
￿ S ￿ P￿ ￿ C￿ :
This leads to the log-linear approximation of relative budget constraints as in equation (32) in
the paper, denoted as ￿d PC:
￿d PC = (2￿ ￿ 1)
(1 + ￿￿￿T)
￿
(b ￿ ￿ d S￿￿) + (1 ￿
(1 + ￿￿￿T)
￿
)(d WL ￿ \ SW￿L): (79)
It is convenient to split this term into two components which can be separately analyzed: the





(b ￿ ￿ d S￿￿) (80)
b Y Non
Fin ￿ (1 ￿
(1 + ￿￿￿T)
￿
)(d WL ￿ \ SW￿L): (81)
33Part 4: Relating b YFin and b Y Non
Fin to ^ ￿; ^ PN ￿ c SP N and relative budget
constraints
Equation (79) de￿nes relative nominal consumption as a function of relative aggregate pro￿ts
and labor incomes. The goal in this section is to express ^ Y Fin and b Y Non
Fin as functions of the




S ~ P ￿MC
F
) and relative nontraded goods prices (as well as to relative
nominal spending which equals relative incomes per de￿nition). In a second step, we will then
make use of the link between these relative prices and exogenous productivity shocks.
We start with ^ Y Fin. The ￿rst step is to approximate aggregate pro￿ts. For this purpose, we
again make use of results from section 1 of the appendix. First, taking into account equations





￿ ￿H + ￿ ￿N
=
1
1 + (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿ PN ￿ YN
￿ Rev
: (82)










Due to symmetry it follows that:
￿ ￿N
￿ ￿







Since the foreign country is characterized by the same structure, we have
(^ ￿ ￿ ^ ￿￿) = ￿
￿￿￿
￿




N (^ ￿N ￿ ^ ￿￿
N): (85)
Now we link relative pro￿ts in the traded and nontraded sector to the terms of trade and relative
nontraded goods prices. For this purpose, we start by expressing domestic pro￿ts in the traded
goods sector in terms of revenues and labor costs. Using equation (49) and taking into account
the de￿nition of pro￿ts (revenues-labor costs) as well as the production technology we get
^ ￿H = ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)d Rev ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿d WLT: (86)
As the foreign country is characterized similarly, we can write
^ ￿H ￿ c S￿
￿
H = ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
d Rev ￿ \ SRev￿
￿
￿ (￿ ￿ 1)￿
￿




We proceed by relating relative revenues and relative labor costs to relative prices. First consider
the total consumer demand function for the domestically produced tradable good. Log-linearizing
around the steady state delivers
d Rev = d a ~ PH + (1 ￿ a)
￿
[ S ~ P￿
H ￿ c ~ PH
￿
+ c aCH + (1 ￿ a)d C￿
H: (88)
34Taking into account that
a ^ CH + (1 ￿ a) ^ C￿
H = ^ YH; (89)
as well as equation (49) plus de￿nition of pro￿ts (= revenues-labor costs), and the production
technology we can rewrite (88) as
d Rev =
￿
c ~ PH ￿ [ ~ PMC
H
￿
+ (1 ￿ a)
￿
[ S ~ P￿
H ￿ c ~ PH
￿
+ \ WLT: (90)
Rearranging (90) and combining it with the analogous expression for the foreign country we get
\ WLT ￿ \ W￿L￿
T = d Rev ￿ \ SRev￿ ￿
￿






H ￿ \ ~ P￿MC
H
￿
￿ (1 ￿ a)
￿
[ S ~ P￿
H ￿ c ~ PH
￿
+ (1 ￿ a￿)
￿




Now recall the following relationships between the markup price of the representative domestic




























￿ AH so that ￿ ~ PMC
H = ￿ PN. We can thus write










































In the paper, the terms of trade (￿) are de￿ned as the domestic traded good￿ s marginal cost price
relative to the foreign traded good￿ s marginal cost price (denominated in a common currency).
The log-linear version of ￿ is thus:
^ ￿ = [ ~ PMC
H ￿ \ S ~ P
￿;MC
F : (99)
Substituting (96)-(98) into (91) yields:
\ WLT ￿ \ W￿L￿






^ ￿ + ￿
￿




By substituting equation (100) into (87) we get
d ￿H ￿ [ S￿￿






^ ￿ + ￿
￿




35What is now left to do is to relate relative revenues to ￿ and ￿PN (and the nominal consumption
di⁄erential). To achieve this, we log-linearize the following de￿nition of relative revenues, while
bearing in mind that N￿(1 ￿ a￿) = 1 ￿ a:




^ ~ PH + ^ CH
￿
+ (1 ￿ a)
￿
d S ~ P
￿





d S ~ P
￿
F + ^ C￿
F
￿
+ (1 ￿ a￿)
￿
^ ~ PF + ^ CF
￿
: (102)
Using the log-linearized consumer demand for domestic tradables we get:
[ aCH = ￿a(1 ￿ a)￿
h￿





c PF ￿ d SP￿
F
￿i
+ d aCT; (103)
(1 ￿ a)d C￿
H = ￿a￿(1 ￿ a)￿
h￿





c PH ￿ [ SP￿
H
￿i
+ (1 ￿ a)c C￿
T: (104)
The log-linear approximations of consumer demand functions for foreign tradables are analogue.
Inserting the consumer demand functions into (100) and recalling that ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ a ￿ a￿ ￿nally
yields the revenue di⁄erential in the traded sector as a function of relative retail prices, relative
wholesale prices, and relative consumption of tradables:




c PH ￿ d SP￿
F
￿



















c ~ PH ￿ d S ~ P￿
F
￿
+ (1 ￿ a)
￿
[ S ~ P￿
H ￿ c ~ PH
￿
￿ (1 ￿ a￿)
￿





However, as our ultimate goal is to link the pro￿t di⁄erential to relative nontraded goods prices
and to the terms of trade, we need to express relative retail and wholesale prices in terms of
relative nontraded goods prices, terms of trade, and the nominal consumption di⁄erential. For
this purpose, we ￿rst log-linearize the domestic demand for traded goods:
c CT = ￿￿c PT + (￿ ￿ 1) ^ P + d PC: (106)








Finally, the traded goods price index can be approximated as follows:
c PT = d aPH + (1 ￿ a)c PF: (108)
Substituting (107) and (108) into (106), then computing the same expression for the foreign
country and substracting foreign consumption of tradables from domestic consumption yields:
c CT ￿ c C￿











c PH ￿ [ SPH
￿











H ￿ c PF
￿
: (109)
36Recalling the relationship between retail prices, wholesale prices and marginal cost prices of
traded goods, we can write
c P￿
H ￿ d SP￿
F = ￿^ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




c PH ￿ [ SP￿
H = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




c PF = d SP￿
F = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿




Substituting (96)-(98) and (110)-(112) into (105) yields




















(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿!) + (￿ ￿ 1)!
1 + !
￿
( ^ PN ￿ ^ P￿
N)
￿ ￿(d PC ￿ \ P￿C￿): (113)
Combining equation (113) with equation (87) yields the traded goods di⁄erential as a function
of relative prices and relative nominal spending:





















d PC ￿ \ SP￿C￿
￿
: (114)
The correspondent expression for the pro￿t di⁄erential in the nontraded sector can be derived
much easier. From (58) it follows that
^ ￿N ￿ ^ ￿￿




In equilibrium, the output of nontraded goods equals the demand for nontraded goods from
consumers plus the demand for retail services, i.e.










Log-linearizing this market clearing condition and using (107),(108) as well as ￿ ￿
￿ PN
￿ PT yields
^ ￿N ￿ c S￿
￿
N =
(! + ￿￿) ￿ ￿! (1 ￿ ￿￿)
(! + ￿￿)(1 + !)
￿￿^ ￿
+
(! + ￿￿) ￿ ￿! (1 ￿ ￿￿)
(! + ￿￿)(1 + !)
￿
￿






d PC ￿ \ SP￿C￿
￿
: (117)
With pro￿ts di⁄erentials for both sectors expressed as functions of the two relative prices and
the consumption di⁄erential we can now relate the aggregate pro￿t di⁄erential to these three
37terms. By substituting (114) and(117) into (85) we can eventually write ^ YFin as follows:

















Relating b Y Non
Fin to relative prices and the consumption di⁄erential is somewhat easier. Simply
substitute (113) into (100) to get
















(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿!) + (￿ ￿ 1)!
1 + !
￿￿






d PC ￿ \ SP￿C￿
￿
: (119)
From (58) and ￿ ￿N ￿ ￿ PN ￿ YN ￿ ￿ W ￿ LN it follows that
d WLN ￿ \ SWL
￿
N = \ PNYN ￿ \ SP￿
NY ￿
N = ^ ￿N ￿ c S￿
￿
N:
Hence, we can use (117) to write
d WLN ￿ \ SWL
￿
N =
(! + ￿￿) ￿ ￿! (1 ￿ ￿￿)
(! + ￿￿)(1 + !)
￿￿^ ￿
+
(! + ￿￿) ￿ ￿! (1 ￿ ￿￿)
(! + ￿￿)(1 + !)
￿
￿






d PC ￿ \ SP￿C￿
￿
: (120)
Part 5: The Complete-Markets Case for ￿ < 0
Once ￿ < 0 the "real exchange rate risk" becomes E0[￿b YFin b Q]=E0[(￿b YFin)2] = ￿ b Q=￿￿b YFin.
The non-diversi￿able labor income hedge is E0[￿b YFin￿b Y Non
Fin ]=E0[(￿b YFin)2] = ￿￿b Y Non
Fin =￿￿b YFin,
with












(￿T￿ ￿ ￿N)￿ b Q
￿
+





￿T (￿ ￿ 1)￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿
2)(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
2(1 ￿ ￿T) ￿ (1 + ￿)
￿







(￿ ￿ 1)￿[￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿T)]￿




￿ ￿ b Q
￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿1 :
38Under this more complex parameter constellation the conclusion we have drawn from above










Part 6: The incomplete markets solution
Up to now we have related relative ^ YFin and b Y Non
Fin to terms also a⁄ected by exogenous produc-
tivity shocks. The ultimate goal, however, is to express the endogenous terms contained in the
optimal portfolio choice condition as functions of the exogenous productivity shocks as well as
of the expression ^ Y Ex
Fin = (2￿ ￿ 1)^ YFin, which is initially treated as exogenous. For our purpose




^ Q ￿ ￿d PC)
| {z }
D
] = 0: (121)
with
￿d PC = d PC ￿ \ SP￿C￿:
We start by linking ^ YFin to productivity shocks and to ^ Y Ex
Fin. First, let us de￿ne relative budget
constraints as the sum of relative ￿nancial and non-￿nancial income:
￿d PC = (2￿ ￿ 1) ^ YFin + b Y Non
Fin = ^ Y Ex
Fin + b Y Non
Fin : (122)
with





c0 ^ w; (124)
^ Y Ex




^ ￿H ￿ d S￿￿
F






d WLT ￿ \ SW ￿ L￿T
















Next, recall from (114) and (117) that ^ ￿ is a function of ^ ￿; ^ PN ￿ d SP
￿
N and ￿d PC:








￿ ^ PN = ^ PN ￿ d SP
￿
N:
Relative wage incomes ( ^ w) can also be related to these terms (see (119) and (120)):
^ w = E^ p + e￿d PC: (128)
The real exchange rate, ￿nally, can also be linked to the terms of trade and relative nontraded
goods prices:
^ Q = q0^ p: (129)
Now recall from equation (32) in the paper that the terms of trade and relative nontraded goods
prices are functions of the productivity shocks, relative budget constraints, and the real exchange
rate. We can, thus, express ^ p as follows:
^ p = ￿
￿1
j






1 ￿1 0 0





























Substituting (130) into (127) and the result into (123) yields





￿d PC ￿ b0D￿
￿1F ^ A:
Using (122) as well as (125) we get
^ YFin = ￿￿
￿
^ Y Ex
Fin + b Y Non
Fin
￿
+ ￿￿F ^ A: (131)
with







40What remains to be done is to relate ^ YNonFin to ^ A and ^ Y Ex








E^ p + e￿d PC
i
:































￿1F ^ A; (132)
with








Dividing by ￿ yields
b Y Non
Fin = ￿w ^ Y Ex















Substituting (133) into (131) and rearranging yields
^ YFin = R1 ^ Y Ex
Fin + R2F ^ A; (134)
with
R1 = ￿￿ (1 + ￿w);
R2 = ￿￿￿w + ￿￿:
In order to link the second term in the portfolio choice equation, here termed D, to ^ A and ^ Y Ex
Fin
we use (129) and (130) to derive





￿i￿d PC ￿ F ^ A
￿
:
This can be rearranged by using (122) and (125):
D =
h











￿1F ^ A: (135)
When substituting (133) into (135) we get
D =
h




Fin + ￿wb Y Non






￿1F ^ A: (136)
41Rearranging this equation ￿nally yields
D = D1 ^ Y Ex










￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)q0￿
￿1i
k
￿w ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
q0￿
￿1:
42